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The Evolution of EU Antitrust Policy: 1966–2017
Pablo Iba´n˜ez Colomo∗ and Andriani Kalintiri†
This article describes, and puts in context, the evolution of the enforcement practice of the
European Commission in the area of EU antitrust law (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU). It considers
all formal decisions adopted in the period between 1966 – when the European Court of Justice
delivered the two seminal rulings that marked the discipline – and the end of 2017. The
article classifies Commission decisions in accordance with four enforcement paradigms. The
descriptive statistics show that the cases that the Commission chooses to prioritise have changed
over the years. First, enforcement has progressively moved towards the core and the outer
boundaries of the system. Second, it has become policy-driven rather than law-driven. Third,
the nature of the cases chosen by the Commission is consistent with its commitment to a ‘more
economics-based approach’ to enforcement. Finally, these cases signal a move towards a more
ambitious stage in the process of the integration of Member States’ economies.
INTRODUCTION
Competition law provisions – irrespective of the jurisdiction – are typically
drafted as general and abstract prohibitions. Article 101(1) TFEU, for instance,
bans agreements that have as their object or effect the restriction of competi-
tion.1 Similarly, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse by dominant firms of
their position.2 The core concepts of the provisions (‘restriction of competi-
tion’, ‘abuse’, ‘dominant position’) are not defined. Sections 1 and 2 of the US
Sherman Act do not differ from their EU counterparts in this regard.3 More-
over, these provisions do not specify the sectors and/or activities to which they
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1 Article 101(1) TFEU reads as follows: ‘The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
internal market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal
market . . . ’
2 Article 102 TFEU reads as follows: ‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant
position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States . . . ’
3 In accordance with the Sherman Act, s 1: ‘Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . . ’; and s 2: ‘Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize
C© 2020 The Authors. TheModern LawReview C© 2020 TheModern LawReview Limited. (2020) 83(2) MLR 321–372
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which
permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no
modifications or adaptations are made.
The Evolution of EU Antitrust Policy: 1966–2017
apply4 nor do they lay down an exhaustive list of the practices that are deemed
anticompetitive.5 The scope and shape of the discipline is thus not established
ex ante. It is instead defined on an incremental, ex post basis.
A first practical consequence of this feature of competition law is that it can
take many forms and can evolve in ways that were not necessarily anticipated at
the time of the enactment of the provisions. The letter of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU supports more or less ambitious, more or less far-reaching enforcement.
At one end of the spectrum, these provisions can be conceived and applied as
modest tools aimed at fighting the most blatant and socially harmful violations.
At the other end of the spectrum, they can be construed as a form of meta-
regulation addressing a wide range of market and/or government failures.
A second practical consequence of this feature is that competition law is a
discipline that can undergo fundamental changes in a seamless way – that is,
without any legislative amendments of the substantive provisions.6
The malleability of competition law provisions provides fertile ground for
legal research. If a given discipline can be shaped in virtually limitless ways, what
explains that it follows one path and not another? How do the institutional
arrangements in place influence the substantive evolution of competition law?
If the substance of competition law provisions is virtually identical around the
world, what accounts for variations across jurisdictions?
The article focuses on the application of competition law provisions by
public authorities, and, more precisely, on how enforcement priorities evolve
over time. Administrative agencies entrusted with investigative and decision-
making powers dominate the institutional landscape in a majority of systems
around the world.7 The EU and its Member States are not exceptions in this
regard.8 Where this institutional arrangement is in place, the choices made by
the public authority have a significant impact on the shape and evolution of
the law. Unlike courts, administrative agencies generally enjoy discretion to
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . . ’
4 Competition law provisions are designed to apply across the board. As a result, the economic
sectors to which they do not apply are typically subject to an express exemption. For instance,
Article 42 TFEU limits the application of competition law provisions to the agricultural sector.
In the US, there are legislative exemptions applying to particular sectors.
5 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU refer to some examples that amount, ‘in particular’ to a restriction
of competition and/or to an abuse of a dominant position. The European Court of Justice (the
Court) has explicitly ruled that the lists provided for in these two provisions are not exhaustive.
See, in this regard, Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc v
Commission EU:C:1973:22 at [26].
6 For an overview of the transformation that US antitrust has undergone, see, for instance, H. Hov-
enkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2005).
7 See E. Fox and M. Trebilcock (eds), The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global Norms,
Local Choices (Oxford: OUP, 2012).
8 For an overview, see I. Lianos and D. Geradin (eds), Handbook on European Com-
petition Law: Enforcement and Procedure (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013); F. Cenzig,
‘An Academic View on the Role and Powers of National Competition Authorities’
Study for the ECON Committee 2016, IP/A/ECON/2016-06 at http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/578971/IPOL_STU(2016)578971_EN.pdf.
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prioritise the cases to which they devote their limited resources.9 The policy
stance of the authority determines the cases they choose to investigate. Policy
positions, in turn, are informed by several factors. The economic structure of
the jurisdiction may be one of them.10 The desire to focus on the most serious
infringements is another. Often, the political agenda of the government in
power – driven by an aspiration to, inter alia, foster innovation, to fight inequality
or to promote fairness – may also influence, directly or indirectly, the nature
and scope of enforcement.
This article provides a positive analysis of the evolution of EU competition
policy across a period of over 50 years (from 1966 to the end of 2017). From
an institutional standpoint, it presents, with the support of descriptive statistics,
the policy choices made by the European Commission (the Commission),
which was responsible for the thrust of enforcement for more than 25 years
and remains a primus inter pares among entities in charge of the application of
EU competition law. From a substantive standpoint, it examines the policy
aspects relating to the interpretation and enforcement of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU. This area of enforcement is often labelled ‘antitrust’ – including by
the Commission itself.11 Accordingly, merger control and state aid, which are
two key aspects of competition policy, are not considered.12 The analysis is
based on a comprehensive database of all formal decisions through which the
Commission has expressed its policy positions.
To a significant extent, the interest of the analysis lies in the two major policy
shifts that EU competition policy underwent during the 1990s. First, the
Commission committed to following mainstream economic principles when
enforcing EU antitrust provisions and when formulating its policy positions.
This shift led to an overhaul of its approach to the legal treatment of, inter
alia, vertical restraints,13 horizontal co-operation agreements14 and unilateral
conduct by dominant firms,15 and it is often known as the ‘more economics-
based approach’ or the ‘more economic approach’.16 Second, the Commission
9 For a focus on the EU from a comparative perspective, see J. Mendes, ‘Administrative Discretion
in the EU: Comparative Perspectives’ in S. Rose-Ackerman, P. Lindseth and B. Emerson (eds),
Comparative Administrative Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2nd ed, 2017).
10 For a discussion of this question, see M. Gal, ‘Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique
Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and by Developing Jurisdictions’ (2009) 33 Fordham
International Law Journal 101.
11 See for instance, the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the Report on
Competition Policy 2016 SWD(2017) 175 final.
12 Mergers in the EU are regulated by means of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20
January 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ L24/1. State
aid, in turn, is regulated by Articles 107 and 108 TFEU.
13 The concept of vertical restraints refers to the clauses imposed in the context of agreements for
the distribution of goods and/or services. The Commission reconsidered its approach to vertical
restraints in its Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy COM(96) 721
final.
14 The approach advocated in the Green Paper on vertical restraints was extended to co-operation
agreements between competitors in the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC
Treaty to horizontal cooperation agreements [2001] OJ C3/1.
15 See, in particular, European Commission, DG Competition, DG Competition discussion paper on
the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses (Brussels, December 2005).
16 See J. Gual and others, ‘An Economic Approach to Article 82’ July 2005 at https://ec.europa.
eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf; A. Witt, The More Economic Approach to
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progressively moved away from a centralised model of enforcement, under
which it enjoyed exclusive powers to apply Article 101(3) TFEU, to a
decentralised system that relies, on the one hand, on the self-assessment by
firms of their practices and, on the other hand, on enforcement before national
courts and competition authorities. This shift was enshrined in Regulation
1/2003, which set out the system for the implementation of Articles 101 and
102 TFEU.17
There are two ways in which this article contributes to the understanding
of EU antitrust law and policy. First, it develops an operational framework that
makes it possible to trace the evolution of the enforcement choices made by a
competition authority. The analysis that follows breaks down these choices into
three main variables, which can be combined to form different enforcement
paradigms. One of the advantages of this framework is that it can be easily
transposed to the analysis of other systems and thus provides the basis for
meaningful comparative work. Second, this article provides – as explained
above – an exhaustive analysis, based on descriptive statistics, of all formal
decisions adopted by the Commission. In this sense, it moves away from past
research, which had a tendency to ground its conclusions on fragmentary
and/or anecdotal evidence.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The first section presents,
in general terms, what are termed the ‘varieties’ of competition enforcement,
that is, the sort of cases that a competition authority can decide to investigate.
The second section, in turn, focuses on the features of EU antitrust law and
policy that make it stand out from other systems. The prominence of some
sui generis enforcement paradigms in the EU regime can only be explained by
such features. The third section presents the dataset, describes the methodology
followed for the presentation of the results and explains the rationale for the
choice of the 1966–2017 period. The results are presented and discussed in
the fourth section. Finally, some conclusions and tentative explanations for the
evolution of the regime are advanced in the fifth section.
VARIETIES OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT
Contemporary competition law applies to a wide range of conduct. On the one
hand, it is routinely enforced against cartels. On the other, it may apply to, inter
alia, the conditions imposed by franchisees for the distribution of their goods
and services, the restraints imposed by the licensors of intellectual property
or the product design choices made by dominant firms. These practices differ
significantly in their nature, objective purpose and effects. Some have a credible
pro-competitive potential. Other practices – such as cartels – can be safely
presumed to serve an anticompetitive aim. The nature of remedial action may
EU Antitrust Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016); D. Waelbroeck and J. Bourgeois, Ten Years
of Effects–Based Approach in EU Competition Law (Brussels: Bruylant, 2012).
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] L1/1.
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also vary greatly. In some cases, firms are merely required to cease and desist
a particular course of conduct. In other cases, they may be required to fulfil
a detailed set of positive obligations. The purpose of this section is to trace
the varieties of competition enforcement in a systematic way. First, it identifies
the three main variables around which the nature of individual cases can be
broken down. Second, it explains how these three variables can be combined
into different enforcement paradigms. Some of these enforcement paradigms
constitute the core of enforcement, while others represent its outer boundaries.
Enforcement variables
When defining its enforcement priorities, a competition authority can choose
to focus on ‘fact-intensive’ or on ‘law-intensive’ cases. This choice is encapsu-
lated in Figure 1. In other words, it can choose to devote its resources either
to cases where the legal characterisation of the practice is uncontroversial and
which thus revolve around whether the alleged facts have been established to
the requisite legal standard (‘fact-intensive’ cases) or to investigations that focus
on whether the facts, as established, amount to a prima facie violation of the rel-
evant provision (‘law-intensive’ cases). ‘Fact-intensive’ cases concern practices
that are, absent exceptional circumstances, prima facie prohibited irrespective
of their effects on competition. As a rule, firms are aware that they consti-
tute an infringement of competition law that is very unlikely to be justified.
Therefore, they tend to conceal these practices, as well as their involvement in
them, from the authority. A cartel is the archetypal example of a ‘fact-intensive’
practice. Precisely because the detection of this conduct is so difficult, compe-
tition authorities around the world have developed a variety of mechanisms to
incentivise firms to uncover their involvement in them and to settle the cases,
once the infringement has been uncovered. The range of ‘fact-intensive’ cases
in a competition law regime varies depending on its peculiarities and on its
stage of development.
The facts underlying a ‘law-intensive’ case tend not to be contentious. As a
result, they are likely to be readily established by an authority. What is more, it
is not unusual that these facts are captured in a formal contract. A distribution
agreement specifying the conditions for the resale of a product comes across as
an obvious example of a ‘law-intensive’ case. These practices are not concealed
from an authority, as they are not subject to a prima facie prohibition rule.
In addition, they are known to serve a plausible pro-competitive rationale. In
particular, they are capable of leading to efficiency gains. Their lawfulness –
and thus the question of whether their anticompetitive effects outweigh any
pro-competitive gain – has to be established on a case-by-case basis. This
case-by-case assessment may turn out to be particularly resource-consuming
and to require input from experts – in particular economists.
The second choice faced by competition authorities is captured in Figure 2
and relates to the divide between inter-brand and intra-brand competition.
The notion of inter-brand competition refers to the rivalry that exists among
the producers of a given good – or the providers of a given service. The notion
C© 2020 The Authors. The Modern Law Review C© 2020 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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Fact-intensive Law-intensive 
Figure 1: Fact-intensive versus law-intensive enforcement
Inter-brand Intra-brand 
Figure 2: Inter-brand versus intra-brand competition
Reactive Proactive 
Figure 3: Proactive versus reactive enforcement
of intra-brand competition, in turn, is used to define the rivalry that exists
for the sale of a given brand of a good or service. Intra-brand competition
exists, for instance, among the members of a franchising system or among the
dealers selling the cars of a particular manufacturer. The lessons of experience
and economic analysis suggest that inter-brand competition is more valuable
and that intra-brand restrictions tend to be problematic, if at all, where there is
insufficient inter-brand rivalry.18
Finally, the cases that a competition authority can choose to investigate can
be differentiated based on the nature of the remedies required to put an end to
the alleged infringement. In this regard, one can distinguish between reactive
and proactive enforcement. Remedial intervention is said to be reactive where
it takes place on a one-off basis and is negative in nature – an obligation not
to do something. An archetypal example is that of a decision requiring the
participants in a cartel to bring the arrangement to an end. The effectiveness of
this command is self-standing in the sense that its implementation demands a
single, stand-alone event. Reactive intervention can also refer to past conduct,
in which case it may be confined to noting that a competition law provision
has been breached and that the firm(s) must refrain from engaging in similar
conduct in the future.
The essence of proactive enforcement is that intervention amounts, in prac-
tice, to the imposition of positive obligations – ending the infringement requires
firms to engage in a particular course of conduct, as opposed to refraining from
doing so. Due to the complexities associated with remedy design in these cases,
a competition authority may leave the choice and implementation of the com-
mand to the firms. Positive obligations are often of a lasting nature or require
regular monitoring. It is possible to identify three broad categories of remedies
18 V. Verouden, ‘Vertical Agreements and Article 81(1) EC: The Evolving Role of Economic
Analysis’ (2003) 71 Antitrust Law Journal 525.
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Detection-
deterrence
Market-
protecting
Market-
shaping
Figure 4: Layers of competition enforcement
that are proactive in nature. One can think, first, of intervention that defines
the conditions under which a product or service must be sold. For instance, a
firm,19 or a group of firms20 may be subject to a duty to deal with customers
and/or rivals on non-discriminatory terms and conditions. Second, proactive
remedies may require firms to alter the design of their products (or their busi-
ness models). For instance, a dominant company may commit to altering the
range of applications available in an operating system.21 Finally, remedial ac-
tion along proactive lines may alter the structure of the market by forcing a
divestiture.
Enforcement paradigms
There are various ways in which the abovementioned variables can be com-
bined. A case can, for instance, be law-intensive, relate to intra-brand com-
petition and lead to the imposition of proactive remedies. Each combination
– or groups of combinations – forms a paradigm. The policy choices of an
authority revolve around these paradigms. The relative importance of one over
the other is a function of the priorities at a given point in time and of the
peculiarities of the competition law system in that jurisdiction. This said, it is
possible to identify some enforcement paradigms that are common to most,
if not all, regimes, and that give an idea of how expansive – or, instead, how
modest – enforcement can be. In this sense, it is useful to think of competition
law as having a core and a series of successive layers. As enforcement moves
away from the core, consensus around it becomes less likely. Figure 4 seeks to
capture the main layers of enforcement.
19 Case C-163/99 Portugal v Commission EU:C:2001:189.
20 Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 285.
21 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission EU:T:2007:289 (Microsoft).
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The core of competition enforcement is made of cases that are fact-intensive
and in which enforcement is reactive in nature. These are cases, in other
words, in which there is no controversy around the nature of the infringement
and in which remedial action can take place on a negative, one-off basis.
For the reasons outlined above, this core will generally be confined, in most
jurisdictions, to inter-brand competition. The challenge for authorities in these
cases does not relate to the design of the remedy or the articulation of a theory
of harm. The challenge lies instead in detecting the infringement – firms
typically conceal ‘fact-intensive’ conduct – and in deterring similar conduct –
by means of high fines and/or criminal and civil sanctions.22 For these reasons,
this paradigm will be referred to as ‘detection-deterrence’. As is true of ‘fact-
intensive’ enforcement, cartels are the prime example of this enforcement
paradigm.
A middle layer that is common to all regimes around the world is made up
of cases that are law-intensive and relate to reactive enforcement that pertains
primarily – if not exclusively – to inter-brand competition. Generally speaking,
competition authorities around the world include these cases in their policy
mix. If they are more controversial than detection-deterrence, this is because
‘law-intensive’ enforcement relates to practices that have ambivalent effects
on competition. As a result, concerns about enforcement errors – that is,
about whether the pro-competitive effects weighmore than the anticompetitive
impact of practices – can be expected to feature prominently in the context
of individual cases. On the other hand, remedial action is less likely to prove
controversial. Since intervention is reactive under this paradigm, it does not
go beyond preserving the structure of the markets in which the practice is
implemented. For the same reason, this paradigm will be referred to as ‘market-
protecting’.
The third layer typically relates to inter-brand competition but may well
relate to intra-brand rivalry, too. Enforcement in this case is controversial not
only because it is ‘law-intensive’ in nature, but also because remedial action is
proactive. Whenever intervention takes a proactive turn, questions are raised
about the ability of competition authorities to craft an appropriate remedy
and/or to monitor its implementation. For instance, it is widely accepted that
authorities are not optimally equipped to define the price at which goods and
services may be supplied.23 Even when the remedy is appropriately crafted,
however, it may fail. A competition authority may order a re-design of a
product, but demand for it may not exist.24
22 In the UK, for instance, the Enterprise Act 2002 introduced the cartel offence (recently revised
by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 47), which provides that a person who has
agreed with one or more other persons that two or more undertakings will engage in prohibited
cartel arrangements may be imprisoned for up to five years, whereas they may also be forced to
pay an unlimited fine. Other sanctions against individuals may include so-called disqualification
orders, whereby directors of companies which have breached the competition rules and whose
conduct makes them unfit to be concerned in the management of a company may be banned
from acting as directors for up to fifteen years (Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986,
ss 9A-9E).
23 P. Areeda, ‘Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles’ (1990) 58 Antitrust
Law Journal 841.
24 ‘EU ruling on Microsoft “flawed”’ BBC News 24 April 2006.
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Controversies around proactive enforcement do not relate only to the de-
sign and/or implementation of the remedy. They are often more fundamental.
As the examples discussed above show, a proactive remedy goes beyond re-
active enforcement in that it does not merely seek to preserve the conditions
of competition prevailing on the relevant market but to alter them. Put dif-
ferently, it represents a move towards ‘market-shaping’ enforcement. In such
circumstances, there is a greater risk of intervention having unintended effects.
For instance, an obligation to supply may have a negative effect on the overall
incentives to invest and to innovate on the relevant market. In other words, it
may harm long-term competition at the expense of short-run rivalry. What is
more, a competition authority may not be in a position to adequately weigh
such considerations against the expected benefits of intervention.
COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT IN THE EU SYSTEM
Competition policy, enforcement and discretion
The Commission has been the central body around which enforcement has
revolved since the inception of the EU system. It enjoys decision-making and
rule-making powers. In addition, it is entrusted with the power to monitor
the interpretation and enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by national
courts and authorities across the EU. The Commission can spell out its policy
positions in several ways. First, it can do so through enforcement in individual
cases. The choice of cases by an authority reflects the paradigm(s) that it
chooses to prioritise. The ability of the Commission to formulate policy in
this way is facilitated by the case law, which has always recognised that, as an
administrative agency, it enjoys discretion when deciding which cases to pursue.
Accordingly, the Commission may reject complaints that are not deemed of
sufficient interest.25 The rejection of complaints is subject to limited review by
the EU courts.26
The decisions through which the Commission formulates policy can be
divided between prohibition and non-prohibition decisions. In the case of
the former, it declares an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and/or Article
102 TFEU. It may also require that the infringement be brought to an end
and impose remedies to this effect and/or a fine. In the current enforcement
landscape, the Commission adopts prohibition decisions pursuant to Article 7
of Regulation 1/2003.27 The Commission may also adopt a broad range of
non-prohibition decisions. Among these, one can identify what can be called
25 See Article 7 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 relating to the
conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty
[2004] OJ L123/18.
26 Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission EU:T:1992:97.
27 In accordance with Regulation 1/2003, Art 7(1): ‘Where the Commission, acting on a complaint
or on its own initiative, finds that there is an infringement of Article 81 or of Article 82 of the
Treaty, it may by decision require the undertakings and associations of undertakings concerned
to bring such infringement to an end. For this purpose, it may impose on them any behavioural
or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed and necessary
C© 2020 The Authors. The Modern Law Review C© 2020 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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Table 1. Non-prohibition decisions in EU antitrust
Old regime (cross-sectoral) Current regime
‘No grounds for action’
decisions
Negative clearance – Article 2 of
Regulation 17
‘Finding of inapplicability’ –
Article 10 of Regulation
1/2003
Exemption decisions Exemption decisions – Article 9
of Regulation 17
‘Finding of inapplicability’ –
Article 10 of Regulation
1/2003
‘Negotiated outcome’
decisions
Comfort letter – informal
decision with no legal basis
‘Commitment decisions’ – Article
9 of Regulation 1/2003
‘no grounds for action’ decisions, which formally declare that the practice
under examination falls outside the scope of the prohibition laid down in
Article 101(1) TFEU and/or Article 102 TFEU. The Commission may adopt
a decision of this nature in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation 1/2003.28
Under the former cross-sectoral regime, established by virtue of Regulation
17, the Commission could formally adopt a ‘negative clearance’ decision.29
The Commission may also decide – in accordance with Article 10 of Reg-
ulation 1/2003 – that a practice satisfies the conditions laid down in Article
101(3) TFEU. Article 101(1) TFEU is declared inapplicable as a result. A deci-
sion of this kind may be termed an ‘exemption decision’. Under the old regime,
there was a specific legal basis for the adoption of such decisions, which consti-
tuted a major pillar of its policy-making activity.30 As explained below, the role
played by exemptions is now fulfilled by the so-called ‘commitment decisions’,
adopted under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003.31 Commitment decisions dif-
fer from the above in that they do not formally declare whether the practice
amounts to an infringement. They provide that, following the commitments
offered by the firms involved, there are no longer grounds for the Commission
to continue with the investigation. In addition, they make the commitments
binding upon the parties.
to bring the infringement effectively to an end. Structural remedies can only be imposed either
where there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural
remedy would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy.
If the Commission has a legitimate interest in doing so, it may also find that an infringement has
been committed in the past’.
28 In accordance with Regulation 1/2003, Art 10: ‘Where the Community public interest relating
to the application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on
its own initiative, may by decision find that Article 81 of the Treaty is not applicable to an
agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice, either because
the conditions of Article 81(1) of the Treaty are not fulfilled, or because the conditions of
Article 81(3) of the Treaty are satisfied. The Commission may likewise make such a finding with
reference to Article 82 of the Treaty’.
29 See Regulation 17, Art 2.
30 See Regulation 17, Arts 6, 8 and 9.
31 In accordance with Regulation 1/2003, Art 9(1): ‘1. Where the Commission intends to adopt a
decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end and the undertakings concerned
offer commitments to meet the concerns expressed to them by the Commission in its prelim-
inary assessment, the Commission may by decision make those commitments binding on the
undertakings. Such a decision may be adopted for a specified period and shall conclude that
there are no longer grounds for action by the Commission’.
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Policy positions may also be expressed by means of legislative and soft law
instruments. As far as the former are concerned, the Commission has the power
to adopt, upon delegation from the Council, block exemption regulations.
Pursuant to a block exemption, Article 101 TFEU is declared inapplicable to
a whole category of agreements.32 Regulations are often accompanied by a
set of guidelines which fulfil two main functions. First, they explain in detail
the concepts and wording used in hard law instruments. Second, they provide
indications about the approach that the Commission intends to take in cases
falling outside of their scope. Guidelines can be adopted even in the absence of
a block exemption regulation. For instance, the Commission has published a
Guidance Paper in which it explains how it intends to prioritise cases relating
to the application of Article 102 TFEU.33
The Commission can also advance its policy positions in the context of a
sector inquiry, which can be conducted pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation
1/2003.34 An inquiry does not relate to a particular practice or firm but to
the functioning of a sector. The very decision to investigate in depth a sector
is in itself a powerful signal of the policy priorities of the Commission. These
priorities can be spelled out more clearly in the documents that are issued in
the context of the inquiry. The Commission, in its practice, releases an ‘issues
paper’35 (at the beginning of the inquiry) and a final report.36 In these, the
Commission identifies the practices which, in its view, amount to a violation
of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU. In addition, it can provide indications about
potential remedies. The final report of the sector inquiry into the energy sector
provides a valuable example in this regard.37
Market integration as an overarching goal
It is not easy to make sense of EU competition law without considering the
context in which it was introduced. The fundamental goal of the EEC Treaty
was to integrate Member States’ economies. Thus, competition law is best
understood as an instrument that is subordinate to the achievement of this
overarching ambition. The concrete consequence is that market integration
is an explicit and autonomous objective of EU competition law. Obstacles to
32 See Article 103(2)(b) TFEU.
33 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty
to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7.
34 Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, Art 17(1): ‘Where the trend of trade between Member States,
the rigidity of prices or other circumstances suggest that competition may be restricted or
distorted within the common market, the Commission may conduct its inquiry into a particular
sector of the economy or into a particular type of agreements across various sectors. In the course
of that inquiry, the Commission may request the undertakings or associations of undertakings
concerned to supply the information necessary for giving effect to Articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty and may carry out any inspections necessary for that purpose’.
35 Energy Sector Inquiry – Issues Paper at https://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/energy/2005
_inquiry/index_en.html.
36 Communication from the Commission Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No
1/2003 into the European gas and electricity sectors COM(2006)851 final.
37 ibid, paras 40-72.
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cross-border trade are problematic in and of themselves. The European Court of
Justice (the Court) clarified this point in the early days. In E´tablissements Consten
S.a`.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v Commission38 (Consten-Grundig), it held
that an agreement giving absolute protection from intra-brand competition is
in principle contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU by its very nature – and thus
without any need to consider its effects on competition. What is more, an
agreement of this kind is unlikely to fulfil the conditions set out in Article
101(3) TFEU.39
Because market integration is an objective of EU competition law, there are
practices that would otherwise be deemed unproblematic, but that are consid-
ered to be serious breaches of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU. The practice
at stake in Consten-Grundig – an agreement giving absolute territorial protec-
tion to the reseller of a product – is one example. Agreements prohibiting40
or disincentivising41 distributors from selling across borders is another. The
Court justifies these decisions by the need to ensure that the very barriers to
trade that the EEC Treaty sought to bring down are not re-erected by firms.42
Unilateral behaviour that has the same objective purpose and/or effect is also
prohibited under Article 102 TFEU. It would be abusive, for instance, for a
dominant firm to take measures to prevent parallel trade.43 More generally, it
would seem that any practice that discriminates on the basis of nationality or
place of establishment is in principle prohibited by its very nature.44
The fact that market integration is an autonomous objective does not place
EU competition law fundamentally at odds with other systems around the
world. The integration of Member States’ economies is compatible with the
protection of the competitive process. By bringing down barriers to trade,
moreover, the internal market leads to gains in allocative and productive effi-
ciency. As a result, there will often be a significant overlap between the creation
of a system of undistorted competition and the integration of Member States’
economies. It is only in relation to relatively small subsets of practices that the
two may be in seeming conflict. The restrictions of intra-brand competition
considered by the Court in Consten-Grundig are the single most significant
subset in this sense. These practices form a paradigm of their own, which, as
explained below, is added to the three main enforcement paradigms already
described.
38 Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64 E´tablissements Consten S.a`.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v
Commission EU:C:1966:41.
39 ibid, 347-350. See also Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010] OJ C 130/1, para 47.
40 Case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v Commission EU:C:1978:19.
41 Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services
Unlimited and others v Commission EU:C:2009:610.
42 Consten-Grundig n 38 above, 340: ‘The Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the
barriers between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a stern attitude with
regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings to reconstruct such barriers. Article
[101(1)] is designed to pursue this aim, even in the case of agreements between undertakings
placed at different levels in the economic process’.
43 Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06 Sot Le´los kai Sia EE and Others v GlaxoSmithKline AEVE
Farmakeftikon Proı¨onton EU:C:2008:504.
44 See Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission
EU:C:1978:22.
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Landmarks in the evolution of EU competition policy
From Centralised Enforcement to Decentralisation and Self-assessment
In 1962, the legislature opted for a centralised enforcement model. Regulation
17 introduced a principle whereby firms were required to notify agreements
falling under Article 101(1) TFEU.45 In addition, it granted the Commission
the exclusive power to adopt exemptions under Article 101(3) TFEU. This
model gave the authority significant leeway to formulate policy and exercise
influence over the interpretation and enforcement of the EU antitrust provi-
sions. At the same time, the model came with substantial costs. It did not take
long before the notification requirement enshrined in Regulation 17 became
a burden. The system could not be implemented in the way it was originally
conceived. As a result, the Commission needed to resort to some adjustments
in order to make it manageable.
Some of the adjustments to the model were enshrined in the Treaty. This
is the case, in particular, of block exemptions, which played an increasingly
prominent role in the system. The Commission also resorted, from the outset,
to soft law instruments allowing firms to self-assess the compatibility of their
practices with Article 101(1) TFEU.46 Other adjustments were informal in
nature. Due to the impossibility of adopting exemptions for every notified
agreement, the Commission issued ‘comfort letters’ declaring that, according to
the information available to it, the agreement either was not caught by Article
101(1) TFEU or fulfilled the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU.47 While
not binding on national courts, ‘comfort letters’ allowed the Commission to
manage the volume of notifications.
Over the years, the Commission increasingly encouraged the enforcement
of EU antitrust law at the national level and the self-assessment of practices
by firms. In 1999, the authority proposed a move away from this incremental
approach by advocating a new decentralised model in its Modernisation White
Paper.48 This model would be enshrined in Regulation 1/2003. As a result,
the Commission no longer has the exclusive power to evaluate whether the
conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU are satisfied.49 On the other hand,
the new system was designed to ensure that the Commission would enjoy
discretion about whether to adopt a formal decision and thus leeway to manage
its caseload. Firms are not entitled to a ‘finding of inapplicability’. Similarly, it
is for the authority to decide whether to close an investigation by means of a
‘commitment decision’ within the meaning of Article 9 of the Regulation.
45 Regulation 17 provided for some exceptions to the principle. See Art 4(2).
46 See Notice on patent licensing agreements [1962] OJ 139/2922; Notice on exclusive dealing
contracts with commercial agents [1962] OJ 139/2921; Notice on cooperation agreements
[1968] OJ C75/3.
47 For a discussion, see D.Waelbroeck, ‘New Forms of Settlement of Antitrust Cases and Procedural
Safeguards: Is Regulation 17 Falling into Abeyance?’ (1986) 11 European Law Review 263.
48 European Commission, White Paper on modernisation of the rules implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the EC Treaty (Brussels, 28 April 1999).
49 For an empirical overview of the question, see European Commission, Ten Years of Antitrust
Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003: Achievements and Future Perspectives COM(2014) 453 and
W. Wils, ‘Ten Years of Regulation 1/2003 - A Retrospective’ (2013) 4 Journal of European
Competition Law & Practice 293.
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Towards a ‘More Economics-based’ Approach
If the system introduced by Regulation 17 became difficult to manage, this is in
part because the Commission favoured a relatively expansive interpretation of
the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. Under its traditional understanding, virtually
all agreements were deemed to restrict competition. In many decisions, the
Commission displayed a tendency to equate a restriction in the freedom of
action with a breach of Article 101(1) TFEU.50 This interpretation has obvious
advantages for the authority. First, it expands the range of practices which
it may potentially oversee. Second, once it is established that an agreement
falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU, it is for the parties to bring
forward evidence showing that the conditions set out in Article 101(3) TFEU
are satisfied.51 Reversing the burden of proof gives the Commission greater
leeway to define whether, and under what conditions, practices are compatible
with the system.
The Commission’s traditional interpretation was frequently criticised not
only for the burden it put on companies (and the system), but because it was at
odds with mainstream economics. In particular, it was noted that the authority’s
analysis was formalistic and ignored the economic and legal context of which
the conduct was part. Typically, administrative action during these early years
failed to consider the conditions of competition that would have existed in the
absence of the practice. Economic analysis suggests that, if a course of conduct
is objectively necessary to achieve a pro-competitive aim, this practice creates
– rather than restricts – competition. Second, the Commission typically failed
to consider the conditions of competition prevailing on the relevant market.
Accordingly, the fact that the parties to an agreement faced strong competitors
or customers did not alter the conclusions of the analysis.52
It was frequently argued, in particular by economists, that the alleged failure
to incorporate mainstream economics led to over-inclusive and under-inclusive
enforcement. Enforcement was arguably over-inclusive in that it imposed strict
conditions on – or even banned – certain practices that were innocuous or
positive from an economic perspective. It was claimed to be under-inclusive in
the sense that it sometimes allowed practices that were likely to harm compe-
tition. A second consequence of this approach is that the Commission did not
prioritise the cases in accordance with their anticompetitive potential. Thus,
50 This aspect was widely discussed in the literature from the 1960s. See for instance R. Joliet,
The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law American, German and Common Market Laws in Comparative
Perspective (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967); V. Korah, ‘EEC Competition Policy – Legal
Form or Economic Efficiency’ (1986) 39 Current Legal Problems 85; and B. Hawk, ‘System
Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review
973.
51 According to settled case law, it was for undertakings ‘to submit all evidence necessary to
substantiate the economic justification for an exemption and to prove that it satisfies each of the
four conditions’, Case T-67/01 JCB Service v Commission EU:T:2004:3 at [162]. Following the
adoption of Regulation 1/2003, this is now enshrined in Article 2, which provides that ‘The
undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article [101(3)] of the Treaty
shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled.’
52 See, for instance, Henkel/Colgate (Case IV/26917) Commission Decision 72/41/CEE [1972]
L14/14.
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it devoted a considerable fraction of its resources to relatively unproblematic
arrangements and failed to take decisive action against cartels.53
In reaction to these criticisms, the Commission overhauled its policy ap-
proach to Article 101 TFEU. The shift is known as the ‘more economics-based’
or ‘more economic’ approach.54 The term ‘effects-based’ is also used.55 One of
the key underlying ideas is that the legal status of a practice should not be based
on its form but on its nature, objective purpose and its actual or potential effects
on competition. First, this approach represents an acknowledgement that, more
often than not, business behaviour has ambivalent effects on competition and
that meaningful enforcement requires an evaluation of the conditions of rivalry
on the relevant market. A second fundamental idea is that like practices should
be treated alike. Thus, firms should not be able to circumvent competition law
by formally changing their conduct.
In relation to Article 101 TFEU, the Commission adopted a new block
exemption applying to vertical restraints in 1999. Unlike its predecessors, Reg-
ulation 2790/1999 was crafted around a key economic insight, which is that
distribution agreements are unlikely to harm competition, unless there is in-
sufficient inter-brand competition.56 Accordingly, it revolved around a market
share threshold, which was used as a proxy for market power.57 The text
represented a shift away from previous legislation, which prescribed in de-
tail the clauses that firms were allowed to include in their agreements. The
‘more economics-based’ approach would also be taken in relation to horizon-
tal co-operation agreements and technology licensing.58 The observed shift
is consistent with the data captured in Figures 5 and 6. As can be seen, the
number of regulations and the overall number of pages has declined, as one
would expect from an approach that takes market power – as opposed to the
clauses drafted in agreements – as a proxy for their pro- and/or anticompetitive
nature.
The new approach also influenced the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU.
The policy in relation to abusive practices was less developed in the 1990s,59 but
53 See D. Neven, P. Seabright, and P. Papandropoulos, Trawling for Minnows: European Competition
Policy and Agreements Between Firms (London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1998).
54 See n 16 above.
55 See L.-H. Roeller and O. Stehmann, ‘The Year 2005 at DG Competition: The Trend towards a
More Effects-Based Approach’ (2006) 29 Review of Industrial Organization 281; and Waelbroeck
and Bourgeois, n 16 above.
56 See the original version of the Guidelines on vertical restraints [2000] OJ C291/1, para 6: ‘[f]or
most vertical restraints, competition concerns can only arise if there is insufficient inter-brand
competition’.
57 See Article 3 of the original Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December
1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and
concerted practices [1999] OJ L336/21. See also Article 3 of the current version: Commission
Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and
concerted practices [2010] OJ L102/1.
58 For the current version see Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, n 20 above and
Guidelines on the application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union to technology transfer agreements [2014] OJ C89/3.
59 See J. Temple Lang, ‘How Can the Problems of Exclusionary Abuses under Article 102 TFEU
Be Resolved?’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 136, a former Commission official, who goes as
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was subject to the same line of criticism. In particular, commentators typically
claimed that the authority did not acknowledge the inherently ambivalent
nature of the vast majority of potentially abusive practices and that a finding
of abuse had become, in essence, a formalistic ‘pigeon-holing’ exercise.60 As
mentioned above, the Commission eventually adopted a Guidance Paper in
which it committed to prioritising cases on the basis of the nature and expected
effects of the allegedly abusive conduct. In several important respects, the
Commission proposed prioritisation criteria that departed fundamentally from
prior administrative practice.61
Varieties of enforcement in the EU system
Defining the Enforcement Variables
After more than five decades of active enforcement of the EU antitrust rules, it
is possible to identify the practices that can be considered to be ‘fact-intensive’
under Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU or both. Cartels are the most ob-
vious example of ‘fact-intensive’ conduct. It has never been seriously disputed
that cartels are prohibited by their very nature under Article 101(1) TFEU62
and firms have used a variety of devices to conceal their behaviour from the
Commission.
Second, it has been clear since 1966 – that is, from the beginning of the
period considered in this article – that practices aimed at restricting cross-
border trade within the EU are prohibited by their very nature under both
provisions. As explained above, this subset of practices comprises agreements
providing for absolute territorial protection, export prohibitions and, more
generally, discriminatory conduct on the basis of nationality.
Third, ‘fact-intensive’ conduct comprises vertical price-fixing. In a resale
price maintenance agreement (as the practice is also known), resellers of a
product are prohibited from deviating from the price set by the suppliers. It is,
in other words, an agreement that eliminates intra-brand competition on the
basis of price. Finally, there are two practices that are ‘fact-intensive’ only in the
context of Article 102 TFEU. One of them is tying63 – whereby a dominant
firm conditions the acquisition of one product to the acquisition of another,
related one – and other comparable practices – in particular, bundling and
far as to argue that Article 102 TFEUwas ‘neglected’ by the authority. See also C.-D. Ehlermann
and I. Atanasiu, European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006), which captures well the state of the debates at the time.
60 See, for instance, J. Kallaugher and B. Sher, ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and
Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82’ (2004) 25 European Competition Law Review 263.
61 Guidance Paper, n 33 above.
62 This point was explicitly addressed by the Court in Case 57/69 Azienda Colori Nazionali –
ACNA SpA v Commission EU:C:1972:78 at [84]-[85]. The idea that cartels are invariably caught
by Article 101(1) TFEU (and give rise to ‘fact-intensive’ cases) was also apparent in the First
Report on Competition Policy, April 1972.
63 Microsoft n 21 above, at [1054].
338
C© 2020 The Authors. The Modern Law Review C© 2020 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2020) 83(2) MLR 321–372
Pablo Iba´n˜ez Colomo and Andriani Kalintiri
Table 2. ‘Fact-intensive’ practices in EU antitrust
Practice
‘Fact-intensive’ under
Article 101 TFEU?
‘Fact-intensive’ under
Article 102 TFEU?
Cartels Yes N/A
Practices aimed at restricting
cross-border trade within the
EU
Yes Yes
Vertical price-fixing (resale price
maintenance)
Yes Yes
Exclusive dealing and practices
having an equivalent effect
No Yes
Tying No Yes
Pricing below average variable cost No Yes
mixed bundling.64 The other one is exclusive dealing65 and practices having
the same effect – such as rebates conditional upon exclusivity66 or rebates
setting an individual sales target that amounts to exclusivity.67
Decades of enforcement also make it possible to provide a concrete taxonomy
of proactive remedies. A proactive remedy is, first, one that amounts to a duty
to deal with a rival or customer – whether this is an obligation to start dealing
or one to resume supplies. The obligation may relate to an infrastructure or
physical input68 or to intangible property, such as a patent.69 Second, the
category includes remedies that prescribe, whether directly or indirectly, the
conditions under which an input must be sold. More generally, this category
also includes other forms of intervention that specify how a firm is to conduct
its business – for instance, how to make price announcements70 – or how
competition is to operate on the relevant market – for example, by prescribing
the share of the market to be made available to rivals. A third sort of remedy
is one that requires a firm to change the design of a product – for instance, by
removing71 or altering72 some features. Fourth, a requirement to divest some
64 ‘Bundling’ usually refers to the way products are offered and priced by the dominant undertaking.
In the case of pure bundling the products are only sold jointly in fixed proportions. In the case of
mixed bundling, often referred to as a multi-product rebate, the products are also made available
separately, but the sum of the prices when sold separately is higher than the bundled price,
Guidance Paper, n 33 above, para 48.
65 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co AG v Commission EU:C:1979:36 at [89]-[90]; confirmed
in Case C-413/14 P Intel Corp v Commission EU:C:2017:632 at [137]. Irrespective of the
interpretation that is given to the latter judgment, the practice was deemed ‘law-intensive’
during the whole of the period considered.
66 ibid.
67 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission EU:C:1983:313 at [73].
68 Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH
& Co KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft
mbH & Co KG EU:C:1998:569 and Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano
S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission EU:C:1974:18.
69 Microsoft n 21 above, and Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE)
and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission EU:C:1995:98.
70 Container Shipping (Case AT.39850) Commission Decision of 7 July 2016.
71 Microsoft n 21 above.
72 Microsoft (tying) (Case COMP/C-3/39.530), Commission Decision of 16 December 2009.
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Table 3. Proactive remedies in EU antitrust
Remedy Examples
Obligation to supply/resume supply on regulated
terms and conditions
CDS, Commercial Solvents, Microsoft I
(interoperability obligations)
Direct or indirect prescription of the conditions
under which an input must be sold
Container Shipping, Rambus, Standard & Poor’s
Obligation to change the design of a product Google Search, Microsoft I (media player),
Microsoft II
Divestiture obligations BA/AA/IB, CEZ, German Electricity
Balancing Market (E.On)
Market-
shaping 
Market-
protecting 
Detection-
deterrence 
Trade-
enabling 
Figure 7: Enforcement paradigms in the EU
assets – and, more generally, any structural remedy – is considered to be a form
of proactive enforcement. The latter is understood to include rights, such as
airport slots.73
Defining the Enforcement Paradigms
To the enforcement paradigms identified earlier, it is necessary to add one
that accounts for the importance of market integration in the EU system. As
already explained, practices aimed at restricting cross-border trade are prima
facie prohibited and, as such, give rise to ‘fact-intensive’ cases. A significant
fraction of decisions involving restrictions to cross-border trade differs from the
typical ‘fact-intensive’ infringement in that it relates to intra-brand competition.
This is true, in particular, of distribution agreements like the one considered in
Consten-Grundig. These cases (which are ‘fact-intensive’, relate to intra-brand
competition and are reactive) form a paradigm of their own, which will be
referred to as ‘trade-enabling’. They relate mostly to trade but occasionally
73 BA/AA/IB (Case COMP/39.596), Commission Decision of 14 July 2010.
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include other ‘fact-intensive’ concerns pertaining to intra-brand competition,
namely resale price maintenance.
AIM, METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
Dataset
The purpose of the analysis that follows is to provide a comprehensive map,
supported by descriptive statistics, of the evolution of the enforcement activity
of the Commission. It is expected to contribute to knowledge in two ways.
First, by systematically classifying the enforcement activity of the Commission
along the paradigms described above. In this regard, the article provides, for
the first time in the field (to the best of the authors’ knowledge) an operational
framework to study and compare the varieties of competition enforcement.
Second, by offering an exhaustive study of the decision-making practice of the
Commission for a period of over 50 years. Again, no similar project has been
undertaken in the field so far.
Drawing a comprehensive map along the lines described above makes it
necessary to identify an appropriate reference point. In this respect, the selected
unit of measurement is formal decisions which have been adopted by the
Commission and reflect the authority’s enforcement choices in the area of
antitrust. It has been explained above that the Commission enjoys discretion to
decide which cases to pursue and it has historically made use of its discretion
to issue formal decisions when the issues raised by a case are deemed important
enough from a policy standpoint. Accordingly, these decisions provide the most
faithful, positive depiction of its enforcement priorities at any given time and
are treated in the present study as such.74 From a substantive perspective, the
article focuses on the formal decisions, whereby the authority enforces Articles
101 and 102 TFEU.
Accordingly, the following data were not considered in the research: first,
Commission decisions in the field of merger control and State aid;75 second,
the research did not include decisions whereby the Commission rejected
74 Because the research is primarily focused on the Commission’s policy views on the application
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, exemption decisions adopted on the basis of a sectoral regime
(such as, for instance, Council Regulation (EEC) 4056/86 laying down detailed rules for the
application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport [1986] OJ L 378/4), rather
than Article 101(3) TFEU, were not included in the dataset. For similar reasons, amending
decisions have also been excluded, since they merely modify an earlier Commission decision.
Re-adoption decisions following the annulment of an earlier Commission decision on the
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have been included in the database.
75 Although both areas constitute key aspects of EU competition policy, they present marked
differences from antitrust enforcement. Merger control was introduced in the EU only in
1989 (see Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of
concentrations between undertakings [1990] OJ L 257/13) and takes place ex ante, rather than
ex post, in the context of a compulsory notification system. State aid, on the other hand, is
addressed against Member States – rather than businesses – and proscribes the grant of an
advantage on a selective basis to undertakings by national authorities where it may distort
competition, except where justified under Articles 107(2) and (3) TFEU.
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complaints about alleged violations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Although
the cases an authority declines to pursue might also offer potentially valuable
insights into its policy views, rejections of complaints were excluded from
the dataset. Complaints are often rejected on lack of Union interest grounds
following a preliminary assessment of the issues raised; as such, they do not
contain a definite, explicit account of the Commission’s understanding of
the competition rules and its underlying choices. More than offering insights
into the enforcement priorities and policy stance of the Commission, they
provide examples of the sort of practices that were not. Fourthly, informal
decision-making instruments, namely the so-called ‘comfort letters’ and press
releases, have likewise been excluded from the data on which the present
research draws,76 for the reason that the issues these cases raised – and/or the
relevant factual scenarios – were not deemed important enough to justify the
formulation of policy by means of a formal decision. Lastly, the research has
not considered Commission decisions concerning the conduct or closure of
proceedings, since they do not positively reflect the authority’s position on the
meaning of the antitrust rules.
For the purposes of the research, all formal decisions whereby the Com-
mission has expressed its policy views in the field of antitrust from 1966 to
2017 were compiled in a comprehensive database. The relevant information
was primarily retrieved from the website of DG Competition77 and, to the
extent possible, it was cross-checked against the authority’s annual competition
policy reports78 and academic sources. The final dataset comprises 632 for-
mal decisions featuring the Commission’s position on the interpretation and
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
The period under examination
The period examined in this article spans the past fifty years – from 1966 to
2017. To allow for its meaningful analysis and the identification of shifts and
patterns in the Commission’s enforcement activity, the data has been organised
around four sub-periods of equal length – 13 years each, namely 1966–1978;
1979–1991; 1992–2004; and 2005–2017. This approach was motivated by
the following reasons. As explained earlier, one of the main landmarks in the
evolution of EU competition policy was themove from centralised enforcement
to decentralisation and self-assessment, as implemented through the adoption
of Regulation 1/2003. The latter became applicable from 1 May 2004.79
The initial impetus for the project was to find an operational framework to
study and map comprehensively the Commission’s activity during the 13 years
76 One should note, in addition, that they have not been recorded in a detailed manner, and,
as a result, it is impossible to recover reliable and sufficient information about their subject
matter and content. While a list of the ‘comfort letters’ sent by the Commission from 1990 to
1997 is available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/comfort_letter.html, there
is almost no information about the subject matter of these cases.
77 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/index_en.html.
78 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/.
79 According to Article 45, Regulation 1/2003 would apply from 1 May 2004.
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fully subject to Regulation 1/2003 – ie 2005–2017. Comparing the choices
made during this period to the enforcement priorities in the years in which
Regulation 17 was – fully or partially (2004) – applicable came across as the
most obvious expansion of the project. To allow for a meaningful comparison
of the evolution of the policy choices made by the Commission, the 1966–2004
period was broken down into three periods of 13 years (thereby matching the
2005–2017 period). In line with what has been explained above, the expansion
of the scope of the project was strictly positive in nature. Establishing a causal
relationship between the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and the changing
policy choices is outside its scope and ambition. If at all, this project provides
the descriptive groundwork for research of that nature.
This choice is indeed meaningful for several reasons. On the one hand, the
first two sub-periods (1966-1978 and 1979–1991) broadly match the lead-up
to the creation of the internal market.80 As far as the competition rules are
concerned, while the Treaty of Rome came into force in 1958, it took a few
years before the Commission started enforcing the antitrust provisions; the first
decision finding a violation was adopted only in 1964.81 The starting point
of the period under examination – ie 1966 – was the year when the Court
ruled for the first time on the meaning of the substantive rules in the context
of a preliminary reference in Socie´te´ Technique Minie`re v Maschinenbau Ulm,82
whereas it also published its judgment in the first action for annulment against
a Commission decision in the seminal Consten-Grundig case.83 Both rulings
set the tone for the application of the EU competition rules in the following
years and played a fundamental role in shaping antitrust enforcement and the
Commission’s policy.
On the other hand, the third sub-period – 1992–2004 – broadly corresponds
to the completion of the single market. It is also the initial phase in the shift
towards a ‘more economics-based approach’ to EU antitrust policy, on the
one hand, and decentralisation and self-assessment, on the other. During this
sub-period, the Commission overhauled its policy with respect to Article 101
TFEU and published various texts aligning its enforcement with mainstream
economic principles in the field of vertical restraints, horizontal cooperation
agreements and technology licensing.84 Around the same time, the authority
published its White Paper on Modernisation, which eventually led to the
80 The Treaty establishing the European Union was signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992.
81 Consten-Grundig (Case IV/3344) Commission Decision 64/566/EEC [1964] OJ 161/2545.
Apart from Consten-Grundig, in the period prior to 1966 the Commission adopted only
seven decisions: four negative clearances (Grosfillex-Fillistorf (Case IV/61) Commission Decision
64/233/EEC [1964] OJ 58/915; Bendix-Mertens and Straat (Case IV/12868) Commission Deci-
sion 64/344/EEC [1964] OJ 92/1426; Nicolas Fre`res -Vitapro (Case IV/95) Commission Deci-
sion 64/502/EEC [1964] OJ 136/2287; Deca (Case IV/71) Commission Decision 64/599/EEC
[1964] OJ 173/2761) and three exemptions (D.R.U.-Blondel (Case IV/2702) Commission De-
cision 65/366/EEC [1965] OJ 131/2194; Hummel-Isbecque (Case IV/2702) Commission Deci-
sion 65/426/EEC [1965] OJ 156/2581; Maison Jalatte (Case IV/22491) Commission Decision
66/5/EEC [1965] OJ 3/37).
82 Case 56/65 Socie´te´ Technique Minie`re v Maschinenbau Ulm EU:C:1966:38.
83 Consten-Grundig n 38 above.
84 See above.
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adoption of Regulation 1/2003, whose date of entry into force coincides with
the last year of the third sub-period – that is, 2004.
Data analysis
The data on which the research draws has been analysed in the context of a
database, which was designed to contain the following information for each
record: a unique ID number; the case number; the date of the adoption of
the decision; the name of the case; the relevant provision; the type of decision
adopted;85 the outcome of the decision;86 whether the case was fact-intensive
or law-intensive; the manifestation of competition to which it pertains, namely
inter-brand or intra-brand competition; the reactive or proactive nature of the
remedial action taken by the authority – if any at all; the number of paragraphs of
the decision; a brief description of the case; whether the case pertains to market
integration; and a link to the text of the Commission decision. The database
was then relied on to provide descriptive statistics on the following questions: (a)
the levels of enforcement activity over the period under examination in terms
of total number and average length of decisions adopted by the authority; (b)
the evolution of competition enforcement from the perspective of each of the
three variables identified above – that is, fact-intensive versus law-intensive
enforcement; inter-brand versus intra-brand competition; and reactive versus
proactive remedial action; and (c) the evolution of competition enforcement
in view of the paradigms described earlier – namely, ‘detection-deterrence’;
‘trade-enabling’; ‘market-preserving’ and ‘market-shaping’.
Regarding the classifications of decisions, the following clarifications are in
order. As far as the outcome of decisions is concerned, it should be noted that,
while negative clearances always lead to a finding that there are no grounds
for action under the competition rules, in several cases the Commission has
adopted such decisions only after the parties informally modified their be-
haviour to address the authority’s concerns. Similarly, exemptions under the
old regime were often granted following concessions made by the parties in-
volved. In this light, the ‘outcome’ column of the database indicates whether
a ‘no grounds for action’ or ‘inapplicability’ conclusion was reached with or
without modifications in the undertakings’ arrangements. This clarification is
important for the proper classification of the remedial action – if any – taken by
the Commission. Where a negative clearance decision has been adopted with-
out any changes in the parties’ conduct, there is no remedial action on part of
the authority. By contrast, where the adoption of a negative clearance or ex-
emption decision follows amendments in the undertakings’ arrangements, the
case may be classified as an instance of either reactive or proactive enforcement
– depending on the nature of the concessions made.
85 Available options: ‘commitments’; ‘exemptions’; ‘infringements’; ‘interim measures’; ‘negative
clearances’; ‘others (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU)’.
86 Available options: ‘fine’; ‘inapplicability’; ‘inapplicability after modifications’; ‘no grounds for
action’; ‘no grounds for action after modifications’; ‘obligations’; ‘other’; ‘prohibition’.
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For similar reasons, exemption decisions adopted without any modifications
on the part of the undertakings and without the imposition of obligations and
conditions may be either instances of no remedial action on the part of the
authority or a manifestation of reactive enforcement. On the other hand, the
grant of an exemption following modifications and/or subject to obligations
and conditions could be a form of either reactive or proactive remedial action.
In this regard, it should be noted that exemption decisions often stipulated
‘information obligations’, ie obligations on the undertakings concerned to
periodically provide the Commission with specific types of information about
the exempted agreement and its implementation. Since these obligations do
not require the parties to modify their behaviour in any way,87 exemptions
subject only to ‘information obligations’ have been classed either as instances
of no remedial action or as manifestations of reactive enforcement.
With respect to the fact-intensive or law-intensive nature of the cases, nega-
tive clearances and exemptions have been identified as instances of law-intensive
enforcement. Indeed, in such proceedings the facts were typically volunteered
by the notifying parties and were not contentious; rather, the focus of the
inquiry was on whether, as a matter of law, the conduct in question fell within
the prohibitive scope of the antitrust provisions. The rest of the decisions were
classified as fact-intensive or law-intensive in the light of their specific character-
istics.88 Likewise, the manifestation of competition to which the Commission
decision pertains was considered on a case-by-case basis. Predominantly, intra-
brand competition is at issue in cases involving vertical restraints.89 Cartels
and abuse of dominance cases, on the other hand, typically (albeit not always)
concern inter-brand competition.
That said, two further remarks are necessary. Cases pertaining to market in-
tegration may relate to either inter-brand or intra-brand competition; for this
reason, they have been identified in the database separately. Commission deci-
sions applying the competition rules to restrictions on parallel trade and/or to
nationality-based discrimination have been invariably classified as being about
market integration. Such cases include not only those falling within the ‘trade-
enabling’ paradigm but also those that require proactive intervention (such as
the alteration of a regulatory regime to allow for the flow of trade). Other cases
have also been coded as relating to market integration. On the one hand, these
involve some decisions falling within the ‘detection-deterrence’ paradigm, in-
sofar as they concern practices for the partitioning of markets across borders
(and more precisely market-sharing arrangements, as well as conduct designed
to prevent market entry). On the other hand, they comprise enforcement ac-
tion preceding and following the adoption of EU-wide legislation aimed at
completing the internal market (and, more precisely, harmonisation measures
in the areas of network industries and intellectual property).
87 See the definitions provided above.
88 ibid. Cases concerning cartels, parallel trade restrictions and vertical price-fixing in the context
of Article 101 TFEU, and cases concerning tying and exclusive dealing or exclusivity rebates in
the context of Article 102 TFEU are typically fact-intensive.
89 See above.
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Finally, some cases may satisfy both options of the enforcement variable in
question. In analysing the data, cases which might be both fact-intensive and
law-intensive have been identified as law-intensive, in line with the focus of
the research on the evolution of the Commission’s views on the interpretation
and enforcement of the antitrust rules. Cases pertaining to both inter-brand
and intra-brand competition – invariably, cases involving vertical agreements
– have been classified as being about inter-brand competition, since vertical
agreements by definition affect intra-brand competition. And lastly, cases in-
volving both reactive and proactive remedial action have been identified as
proactive, given that competition law is, at its core, proscriptive, rather than
prescriptive.
RESULTS
Levels of enforcement activity
The levels of enforcement activity, measured by the number of formal decisions
adopted, have slightly increased over the years. As Figure 8 illustrates, in the first
period under examination the authority adopted 116 decisions in total, whereas
in the most recent one the number of formal decisions on the substantive
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU was 140. The second phase was the
most active for the Commission (182 decisions) – closely followed by the third
(169 decisions).
However, while the total number of decisions per period has not grown
substantially, there has been a clear shift in the type of decisions adopted by
the authority. As seen in Figure 8, in the first two periods the ratio between
decisions finding a prohibition of the competition rules and non-prohibition
decisions was almost one to one.90 By contrast, in the last two periods there
has been a rise in the number of prohibition decisions and a gradual, yet
steady decline in non-prohibition decisions with the ratio between the two
in the last thirteen years being more than two to one.91 In addition, the
length of prohibition decisions has increased sharply since the second period
of competition enforcement, as Figure 9 below demonstrates.92 Regrettably,
it was not possible to extract the average number of paragraphs per decision
during the first period, because the authority started consecutively numbering
the paragraphs of its decisions in the course of the second period.93 Even so, the
trend in the last three periods for which there is available data is unmistakeable.
90 The Commission adopted 57 prohibition decisions versus 59 non-prohibition decisions during
1966-1978 and 85 prohibition decisions versus 97 non-prohibition decisions during 1979-1991.
91 During 1992-2004 the authority adopted 106 prohibition decisions versus 63 non-prohibition
decisions, whereas during 2005-2017 it adopted 100 prohibition decisions versus 40 non-
prohibition decisions.
92 The average number of paragraphs per decision was 34 during 1979-1991; 182 during 1992-
2004; and 376 during 2005-2017.
93 It should be noted that the paragraphs of 14 decisions (out of the 182 in total) adopted during
the second period are not consecutively numbered and thus these decisions were not included
in the calculation.
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Commission decisions finding an infringement of the competition rules in
the last period were on average 502 paragraphs long – more than double the
average length of prohibition decisions in the third period and almost ten
times lengthier than the average prohibition decision in the second period
under examination.94 As far as non-prohibition decisions are concerned, on
the other hand, their average length has also risen since the first two periods of
enforcement, but not as significantly, whereas in the past years it has steadied at
nearly 100 paragraphs per decision.95 As a result, the gap between the average
length of prohibition and non-prohibition decisions has grown larger over
the years with prohibition decisions currently being approximately five times
lengthier than non-prohibition ones.
Evolution of enforcement across the three variables
With respect to the fact-intensive or law-intensive nature of the cases which
resulted in the adoption of a formal decision expressing the Commission’s views
on the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, there has been an important
shift, captured in Figures 10 and 11. While in the first two periods compe-
tition enforcement was predominantly law-intensive with fact-intensive cases
representing less than 40 per cent thereof,96 the ratio has been reversed in the
most recent period under examination, where fact-intensive cases correspond
to over 60 per cent of the total number of cases which resulted in a formal
Commission decision on the application of the antitrust provisions.
Considering the manifestation of competition to which enforcement per-
tains, shown in Figures 12 and 13, the Commission’s decision-making activity
has consistently focused on inter-brand competition. The lowest number of
decisions concerning inter-brand competition was recorded in the second pe-
riod, but, even then, such decisions were at least three times more than those
pertaining to intra-brand competition.97 Quite remarkably, in the most recent
period under examination the number of inter-brand competition cases cor-
responds to about 95 per cent of the total number of decisions adopted by the
authority.98
94 The average number of paragraphs per prohibition decision was 234 during 1992-2004 and 68
during 1979-1991.
95 The average number of paragraphs per non-prohibition decision was 50 during 1979-1991; 95
during 1992-2004 and 93 during 2005-2017.
96 Fact-intensive cases corresponded to 37.07% of the total number of decisions during 1966-1978;
36.26% during 1979-1991; 46.75% during 1992-2004 and 61.43% during 2005-2017. Law-
intensive cases respectively represented 62.93% of the total number of decisions during 1966-
1978; 63.74% during 1979-1991; 53.25% during 1992-2004 and 38.57% during 2005-2017. In
absolute numbers, during 1966-1978 the Commission adopted 43 fact-intensive decisions versus
73 law-intensive ones; during 1979-1991 it adopted 66 fact-intensive decisions versus 116 law-
intensive ones; during 1992-2004 it adopted 79 fact-intensive decisions versus 90 law-intensive
ones; and during 2005-2017 it adopted 86 fact-intensive decisions versus 54 law-intensive ones.
97 During 1979-1991 the authority adopted 139 decisions pertaining to inter-brand competition
versus 43 decisions relating to intra-brand competition. The ratio was 91 to 25 during 1966-
1978; 148 to 21 during 1992-2004; and 133 to seven during 2005-2017.
98 In percentages, inter-brand competition enforcement represented 78.44%, 76.37%, 87.57% and
95% of the total number of decisions in each of the four periods in chronological order,
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Figure 10: Fact-intensive versus law-intensive enforcement in percentages
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Figure 11: Fact-intensive versus law-intensive enforcement in absolute numbers
C©
2
0
2
0
T
h
e
A
u
th
o
rs.
T
h
e
M
o
d
ern
L
aw
R
ev
iew
C©
2
0
2
0
T
h
e
M
o
d
ern
L
aw
R
ev
iew
L
im
ited
.
(2
0
2
0
)
8
3
(2
)
M
L
R
3
2
1
–
3
7
2
3
5
1
T
h
e
E
vo
lu
tio
n
o
f
E
U
A
n
titru
st
P
o
licy
:
1
9
6
6
–
2
0
1
7
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1966-1978 1979-1991 1992-2004 2005-2017
Inter-brand vs intra-brand compeon: percentages
Inter-brand Intra-brand
Figure 12: Inter-brand vs intra-brand competition in percentages
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Figure 13: Inter-brand vs intra-brand competition in absolute numbers
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Figure 14: Reactive vs proactive enforcement in percentages
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Figure 15: Reactive vs proactive enforcement in absolute numbers
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Lastly, there are significant patterns in the Commission’s enforcement ac-
tivity when seen from the perspective of remedial action. In this respect, two
findings stand out. First, cases formally closed with no remedial action have
been virtually extinguished during the most recent period under consideration,
ie 2005 to 2017. As seen in Figures 14 and 15, while such cases represented
a small, yet non-negligible, chunk of overall enforcement in the first three
periods, they have completely disappeared in the past years.99 Second, one can
identify a steady rise of proactive enforcement across the four periods. During
1966–1978 and 1979–1991, proactive remedial action was taken in fewer than
three per cent of the total number of cases respectively. This percentage, how-
ever, increased almost six-fold during 1992–2004 and climbed up to 25 per
cent in the last period under examination.100
Evolution of enforcement paradigms
Lastly, the three variables were analysed in combinations with a view to
measuring the evolution of competition enforcement in light of the different
paradigms, as defined above. The results of this descriptive analysis are shown
in Figures 16 and 17.101 The following findings are worth highlighting. First,
over the first two periods the features of the Commission’s enforcement
activities were very similar: ‘market-protecting’ enforcement represented
about 40 per cent of the cases decided by the authority; approximately another
25 per cent corresponded to ‘detection-deterrence’ enforcement; about 10 per
whereas intra-brand competition enforcement corresponded to 21.56%, 23.63%, 12.43% and
5% respectively.
99 During the first period, the Commission adopted 21 decisions which did not entail any re-
medial action versus 92 decisions involving reactive enforcement and three involving proactive
enforcement. This number increased during the second period to 36 decisions entailing no re-
medial action vis-a`-vis 141 instances of reactive enforcement and five manifestations of proactive
enforcement. During the third period, the number of decisions without any remedial action
dropped to 15 vis-a`-vis 123 decisions involving reactive enforcement and 30 cases of proactive
enforcement. Finally, in the last period there were 104 instances of reactive enforcement and
36 instances of proactive enforcement, but no case included in the dataset where the authority
took no remedial action.
100 In percentages, proactive enforcement represented 2.59% of overall enforcement during the first
period; 2.75% during the second period; 17.86% during the third period; and 25.72% during
the fourth period.
101 In absolute numbers, ‘detection-deterrence’ enforcement represents 30 cases in the first period,
41 in the second, 61 in the third and 84 in the fourth; ‘trade-enabling’ enforcement corresponds
to 13 cases in the first period, 23 cases in the second, 18 cases in the third, and only one case in
the fourth; ‘market-protecting’ enforcement represents 49 cases in the first period, 77 cases in
the second, 45 in the third period, and 19 cases in the fourth; and ‘market-shaping’ enforcement
corresponds to three cases in the first period, five cases in the second, 30 cases in the third and
36 cases in the fourth. The number of cases where no remedial action was taken was 21 during
the first period, 36 during the second, 15 during the third and zero during the fourth. The
percentages of ‘detection-deterrence’, ‘trade-enabling’, ‘market-protecting’, ‘market-shaping’
enforcement and ‘no remedial action’ cases were 25.86%, 11.21%, 42.24%, 2.59% and 18.10%
respectively during the first period; 22.53%, 12.64%, 42.31%, 2.75% and 19.78% respectively
during the second period; 36.1%, 10.65%, 26.63%, 17.75% and 8.86% respectively during the
third period; and 60%, 0.71%, 13.57%, 25.71% and 0% respectively during the fourth period.
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Figure 16: Enforcement paradigms in percentages
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Figure 17: Enforcement paradigms in absolute numbers
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Figure 18: Centripetal and centrifugal shifts in competition enforcement
cent of the cases were manifestations of the ‘trade-enabling’ paradigm; whereas
fewer than three per cent of the adopted decisions constituted instances
of ‘market-shaping’ action. By contrast, the picture of enforcement is very
different during the last period. ‘Market-protecting’ enforcement has shrunk
to less than 14 per cent, whereas ‘trade-enabling’ enforcement has almost
completely disappeared. ‘Detection-deterrence’ enforcement, on the other
hand, represents about 60 per cent of the cases decided by the Commission.
‘Market-shaping’ enforcement has similarly increased significantly – already
during the third period under examination, where it amounted to nearly 18
per cent of the adopted decisions – and during 2005–2015 it corresponded to
one fourth of the authority’s total activity.
DISCUSSION
Centripetal and centrifugal shifts in enforcement
The most noticeable aspect of the evolution of EU antitrust policy in the
last two periods is the shift towards the ‘detection-deterrence’ and ‘market-
shaping’ paradigms. As depicted in Figure 18, enforcement activity has moved
towards the core – a centripetal shift – and towards the edges – a centrifugal shift.
These shifts are consistent with the view that the role of the Commission has
changed following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 – and it has changed
in accordance with the vision sketched by the authority in its Modernisation
White Paper. Second, they show that formal decisions are no longer the primary
instrument for providing interpretations of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In this
C© 2020 The Authors. The Modern Law Review C© 2020 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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sense, the observed evolution reveals that enforcement has become increasingly
policy-driven, as opposed to law-driven. Third, they provide hints about the
influence of economic analysis. Finally, they suggest that the demise of ‘trade-
enabling’ enforcement has not led to a decline of enforcement primarily driven
by market integration considerations. If anything, such cases have become more
ambitious, in line with the process of European integration.
The dual role of the Commission under Regulation 1/2003: enforcer
and guide
According to the descriptive statistics, the ‘market-protecting’ and ‘trade-
enabling’ paradigms are no longer an enforcement priority for the Commission.
One can think of many reasons why an administrative authority may choose
to devote its limited resources to the most egregious and socially harmful
violations of EU antitrust provisions – ‘detection-deterrence’ cases – and to
‘market-shaping’ enforcement, in particular following the adoption of a new
enforcement regime. Even though ‘market-shaping’ enforcement raises com-
plex issues relating to the design and implementation of remedies, it has the
potential to yield substantial gains for competition, when successful. The ob-
served centripetal and centrifugal shifts are also interesting, in any event, in
that they are consistent with the expected changes in the role and status of the
Commission following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003.
As already explained, Regulation 1/2003 gave the Commission greater
leeway to prioritise cases. Together with decentralised enforcement, this
change allows it to deal with some categories of cases – some paradigms – in
a different way. In this sense, Regulation 1/2003 has eased the ability of the
Commission to adopt a dual role – as an enforcer, on the one hand, and a guide
to national courts and authorities, on the other. In the new legal landscape,
the need for it to formulate policy by adopting decisions in individual cases
is far less pressing. In addition to prohibition and non-prohibition decisions,
the Commission can also outline its stance in soft law instruments and it
can become involved in proceedings at the national level. Depending on the
relevance and relative novelty of an issue it can choose to enforce or steer
instead. In this institutional framework, the Commission is able to deprioritise
certain enforcement paradigms in its decision-making practice.
For instance, during the fourth period considered, enforcement against ver-
tical restraints, which featured prominently in the three preceding periods, all
but disappeared.102 Remarkably, the focus away from these practices took place
at the same time that the Internet was transforming firms’ distribution meth-
ods and strategies, some of which have given rise to novel legal issues. These
legal issues have been addressed by national courts and authorities, occasionally
102 The very few decisions on vertical issues during the last period include eBooks (Case
AT/39847) Commission Decision of 12 December 2012; and SEP et autres/Peugeot SA (Cases
F-2/36.623/36.820/37.275) Commission Decision of 5 October 2005.
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leading to conflicting interpretations and outcomes.103 Between 2005 and
2017, the Commission intervened by expressing its policy positions regarding
the said issues in the Guidelines on vertical restraints and in the context of a
sector inquiry into e-commerce.104
An exclusive focus on the decision-making activity of the Commission
conceals the role of the authority as a guide and thus provides an incomplete
picture of the various ways in which it formulates policy and expresses its
choices. An indicator of the growing importance of its steering activity is the
rise of soft law instruments following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003.
As seen in Figure 19, the absolute number of Guidelines and other soft law
instruments has progressively increased over the years, in parallel with steps
towards decentralised enforcement and self-assessment. Figure 20, which looks
at the total number of pages, also shows a significant increase. Similarly, the
Commission’s policy cannot be entirely understood without examining its
submissions to national courts105 or those to the Court in the context of a
reference for a preliminary ruling.106
From law-driven to policy-driven enforcement
In any competition law system, ‘market-protecting’ enforcement typically fulfils
an important precedent-setting function. Since this paradigm relates to conduct
that has an ambivalent impact on competition, enforcement in individual cases
is important to identify the factors that are relevant in the evaluation of the
103 As happened, for instance, in the recent investigations by national competition authorities
into the use of ‘most-favoured-nation’ clauses in the online hotel booking sector. For a brief
overview, see M. Colangelo, ‘Parity Clauses and Competition Law in Digital Marketplaces:
The Case of Online Hotel Booking’ (2017) 8 Journal of European Competition Law & Prac-
tice 3. The divergence in the outcomes eventually reached in the various Member States
prompted the European Competition Network to organise a monitoring exercise with the
participation of 11 EU competition authorities with a view to measuring the effects of
the different imposed remedies on the use of parity clauses in online travel agents’ con-
tracts with hotels. The final report of this exercise was published in 2016 and is available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/hotel_monitoring_report_en.pdf.
104 See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries_e_commerce.html. The
launch of the sector inquiry may lead to a re-orientation of the Commission policy in the
coming years. See, eg, some decisions adopted by the Commission in 2018: Philips (Case
AT.40181) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018; Pioneer (Case AT.40182) Commission
Decision of 24 July 2018; Asus (Case AT.40465) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018; Denon
& Marantz (Case AT.40469) Commission Decision of 24 July 2018; and Guess (Case AT.40428)
Commission Decision of 17 December 2018.
105 Pursuant to Regulation 1/2003, Art 15(3), ‘Where the coherent application of Arti-
cle [101] or Article [102] of the Treaty so requires, the Commission, acting on its
own initiative, may submit written observations to courts of the Member States’. The
‘amicus curiae’ observations that the Commission has submitted so far are available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_amicus_curiae.html.
106 Recent examples of cases where the Commission submitted observations to the Court include,
for instance, Case C-52/09 TeliaSonera Sverige EU:C:2011:83; Case C-209/10 Post Danmark
EU:C:2012:172; Case C-23/14 Post Danmark EU:C:2015:651; Case C-230/16 Coty Germany
EU:C:2017:941.
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Figure 19: Number of soft law instruments in force (middle and end of each period) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Figure 20: Sum of pages of soft law instruments in force (middle and end of each period) [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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pro- and anticompetitive effects of practices and that may make intervention
more or less likely as a result. The case-by-case application of Articles 101
and 102 TFEU, in other words, is valuable to understand the boundaries
of antitrust provisions and the line between pro- and anticompetitive conduct.
Enforcement is said to be ‘law-driven’ when its primary – if not only – function
is to offer an interpretation of the law and provide legal certainty to stakeholders.
This is opposed to ‘policy-driven’ enforcement, which is primarily concerned
with the outcome sought.
With the centrifugal and centripetal shifts, the precedent-setting function of
individual decisions has become less important. There has been, in other words,
a decline in ‘law-driven’ enforcement. Other features of the contemporary
activity of the Commission are consistent with this conclusion. One of these
features is captured in Figure 21. ‘No grounds’ for action decisions, which made
up a significant fraction of enforcement in the first two periods, disappeared
following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003. At the time of writing this
article, the Commission had not yet adopted a single decision finding either
that a practice does not fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU or that it
does not amount to an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.
A related factor, leading to the same conclusion, is the fact that exemption
decisions have been replaced, in practice, by ‘commitment decisions’. As ex-
plained above, a key feature of the latter is that they do not state whether the
EU antitrust provisions have been infringed. The legal analysis is confined to a
‘preliminary assessment’.107 In this sense, it is an instrument that is appropriate
for ‘policy-driven’ – and not ‘law-driven’ – enforcement. Figure 22 shows the
extent to which ‘policy-driven’ enforcement appears to have dominated the
practice of the Commission in the last period. First, ‘detection-deterrence’ en-
forcement, which is by definition ‘policy-driven’, accounts for 61 per cent of
all decisions adopted during that period. Secondly, cases decided by means of
‘commitment decisions’ account for 28 per cent of all decisions. Thus, a mere
15 prohibition decisions – or 11 per cent of the total number – are potentially
‘law-driven’. Some of these decisions were adopted with the explicit purpose of
clarifying a point of law. This is true, for instance, ofMotorola, issued in 2014.108
Other decisions, however, have a stronger policy-driven flavour, in that they
appear to relate to the same issues in a particular sector of the economy. Thus,
three of these prohibition decisions were adopted in the telecommunications
107 See the wording of Regulation 1/2003, Art 9(1), n 31 above. On commitment decisions
in EU competition enforcement, see generally, F. Wagner-Von Papp, ‘Best and Even Better
Practices in Commitment Procedures after Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the “Struggle
for Competition Law”’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 929; N. Dunne, ‘Commitment
Decisions in EU Competition Law’ (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law & Economics 399; M.
Wathelet, ‘Commitment Decisions and the Paucity of Precedent’ (2015) 6 Journal of European
Competition Law & Practice 553.
108 Motorola - Enforcement of GPRS standard essential patents (Case AT/39985) Commission Decision
of 29 April 2014.
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Figure 21: The decline of ‘no grounds for action’ decisions
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Figure 22: Prohibition and non-prohibition decisions (2005-2017)
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sector (and addressed the same legal questions),109 four in the pharmaceutical
sector110 and three relate to payment services.111
In fact, the concentration of enforcement activity around certain sectors of
the economy is one of the most salient aspects of the last period. As seen in
Figure 23, around one third of all non-cartel decisions relate to recently lib-
eralised network industries – the activity in the energy sector is particularly
remarkable. The automobile sector and other sectors mentioned above – pay-
ment systems and pharmaceuticals – have also given rise to recurrent interven-
tion. The clustering of policy activity around certain industries is another factor
that hints at the rise of ‘policy-driven’ enforcement. What is more, antitrust
enforcement in certain ‘clusters’ overlaps with EU-wide policy initiatives. The
liberalisation of network industries (telecommunications, energy, transport) is
an obvious example of such an overlap.112 Sometimes, these EU-wide initia-
tives prompt the launch of a sector inquiry that eventually leads to enforcement,
as is true of the inquiry into the energy sector. The promotion of the so-called
Digital Single Market is another one.113
Enforcement and the ‘more economics-based approach’
The transformation of enforcement in the last two periods is consistent
with what one would expect from a competition law system informed by
mainstream economics. Some conclusions can be drawn from a cursory
overview of the data. The prioritisation of cartel cases during the last two
periods – in particular the fourth one – is particularly eloquent. The virtual
demise of ‘trade-enabling’ enforcement is also consistent with the rise of the
‘more economics-based approach’. While these cases are highly symbolic
in that they reflect the commitment of the EU competition law system to
the integration of Member States’ economies, they are typically innocuous
109 Wanadoo Espan˜a v Telefo´nica (Case COMP/38784) Commission Decision of 4 July 2007; Teleko-
munikacja Polska (Case COMP/39525) Commission Decision of 22 June 2011; Slovak Telekom
(Case COMP/39523) Commission Decision of 15 October 2014.
110 AstraZeneca (Case COMP/37507) Commission Decision of 15 June; Lundbeck (Case AT/39226)
Commission Decision of 19 June 2013; Perindopril (Servier) (Case AT/39612) Commission
Decision of 9 July 2014; Fentanyl (Case AT/39685) Commission Decision of 10 December
2013.
111 Morgan Stanley Dean Witter/Visa (Case COMP/37860) Commission Decision of 3 Octo-
ber 2007; MasterCard, EuroCommerce, Commercial Cards (Cases COMP/34579, COMP/36518,
COMP/38580) Commission Decision of 19 December 2007; Groupement des cartes bancaires
‘CB’ (Case COMP/38606) Commission Decision of 17 October 2007.
112 See Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on
a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services [2002]
OJ L108/33; Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July
2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive
2003/55/EC [2009] OJ L211/94; and Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC [2009] OJ L211/55.
113 See ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ Communication from the Commission to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, COM/2015/0192 final.
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when considered from an economic perspective. In addition, they divert
enforcement resources away from more problematic infringements.
Other aspects relating to the ‘more economics-based’ approach require a
more detailed analysis of the data. One reason why the enforcement of Article
102 TFEU gave rise to considerable controversy in the 1990s and early 2000s
related to the fact that the Commission prioritised borderline cases in which
it was not clear that the firm was dominant in the first place. Cases like British
Airways and Michelin II, which led to a review of the authority’s policy with
regard to abusive conduct, were criticised not only because of the legal test
endorsed, but also because the available evidence cast doubt about the firms’
ability to significantly influence the conditions of competition.114 It would
seem that, since 2005, the enforcement efforts have focused on cases in which
the likelihood of anticompetitive harm was greater. Incumbent operators in
network industries, for instance, typically enjoy very high market shares, and
this on markets which feature high barriers to entry.115 The Commission has
also followed closely developments in high technology industries, the dynam-
ics of which are sometimes conducive to the emergence of super-dominant
positions, if not quasi-monopolies.116
The rise and rise of market integration as an objective of EU antitrust
Following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003, the most EU-specific of
paradigms – ‘trade-enabling’ enforcement – has virtually disappeared. This
fact could be interpreted as meaning that market integration considerations
no longer inform policy action. A careful analysis of the data, summarised in
Figure 24, does not provide support for this conclusion. It would seem that
market integration, if anything, has a more prominent role than in the past and
leads to more ambitious enforcement. While it is true that ‘trade-enabling’ en-
forcement is no longer a policy priority, it is also true that cases that are directly
driven by market integration considerations have not declined significantly.
Policy activity aimed at the integration of Member States’ economies has
changed to become more proactive in nature. In the energy sector, for instance,
remedial action has led to divestitures aimed at addressing nationality-based
discrimination.117 In other cases, incumbent operators have agreed not
only to give access to their infrastructure, but to invest in capacity so as to
114 See M. Motta, ‘Michelin II: The Treatment of Rebates’ in B. Lyons (ed), Cases in European
Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
115 C. Decker, Modern Economic Regulation: An Introduction to Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2014).
116 See, generally, O. Shy, The Economics of Network Industries (New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press, 2010); Y. Bramoulle´, A. Galeotti and B. Rogers (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the Economics
of Networks (Oxford: OUP, 2016).
117 German Electricity Wholesale Market (Case COMP/39388) and German Electricity Balancing Market
(Case COMP/39389), Summary of Commission Decision of 26 November 2008 relating to a
proceeding under Article [102 TFEU] and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement [2009] OJ C36/8;
CEZ (Case AT/39727) Commission Decision of 10 April 2013; Romanian Power Exchange (Case
AT.39984) Commission Decision of 5 March 2014.
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Figure 24: Market-integration driven enforcement
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accommodate new entrants on formerly monopolised markets. The steps
taken towards the creation of a Digital Single Market, mentioned above, only
confirm this view. Intervention in some of the cases amount to the re-shaping
of national copyright systems.118
The observed shift in enforcement appears to mirror the evolution that the
process of European integration underwent in the late 1980s and, in particular,
in the 1990s. In the preceding decades, the efforts had focused on bringing
down cross-border barriers to trade. This focus is faithfully reflected in the
enforcement activity of the Commission, which prioritised ‘trade-enabling’
cases. The liberalisation of network industries took the efforts aimed at building
the internal market a step further. Action at the EU level was no longer confined
to ensuring market access across borders. Rather, it aimed to inject competition
on markets formerly protected by exclusive rights. The regulatory apparatus
of the new regimes was conceived to re-shape markets by undermining the
dominant positions enjoyed by these firms across the value chain. Against this
background, EU antitrust law has been enforced, first, to preserve the fruits of
the liberalisation process by preventing the re-monopolisation of markets;119
and second, to re-shape markets so as to accommodate rivalry through pro-
active enforcement.120
CONCLUSIONS
The institutional changes that the EU competition law system has undergone
over the decades have progressively given the Commission increased leeway to
decide how to make use of its limited resources. Under Regulation 1/2003,
which captures the essence of these changes, firms are not entitled to a deci-
sion declaring that their practices are compatible with Article 101 and/or 102
TFEU. Similarly, the Commission has discretion to decide whether to close an
investigation following the commitments offered by the parties or whether to
adopt a prohibition decision imposing remedies upon them. Enforcement has
evolved along with institutional change. The Commission’s decision-making
activity has increasingly focused on the most egregious infringements (la-
belled ‘detection-deterrence’) and on cases leading to the re-shaping of markets
through the adoption of proactive remedies. As a result, enforcement has moved
towards the edges. The Commission seems to prioritise the least controver-
sial and most socially harmful practices, on the one hand, as well as the cases
which, while inherently controversial, have the greatest potential to improve
the conditions of competition, on the other.
118 See in particular Cross-border access to pay-TV (Case AT.40023) Commission Decision of 26 July
2016.
119 Deutsche Telekom (Case COMP/37451, 37578, 37579) Commission Decision of 21 May 2003
[2003] OJ L263/9; German Electricity Wholesale Market (Case COMP/39388) and German Elec-
tricity Balancing Market n 117 above; CEZ n 117 above; Romanian Power Exchange n 117 above.
120 Distrigaz (Case COMP/37966) Commission Decision of 11October 2007; Swedish Interconnectors
(Case 39351), Commission Decision of 14 April 2010; CEZ (Case AT/39727) Commission
Decision of 10 April 2013; E.ON Gas (Case AT/39767) Commission Decision of 26 July 2016.
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The observed shift in enforcement is consistent with other mutations of the
EU competition law system. Following the adoption of Regulation 1/2003,
the Commission can effectively fulfil its dual role as an enforcer and a guide in-
fluencing the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by national courts and
authorities. As a result, some questions that were dealt with via the adoption of
individual decisions can now be addressed through soft law instruments, where
the Commission can express its policy positions, and through the co-operation
mechanisms introduced in Regulation 1/2003. In the new institutional land-
scape, the law-making function of EU antitrust enforcement does not appear
to have as much prominence as it used to. The activity of the Commission
has become more policy-driven. This phenomenon is reflected in the dom-
inance of cartel enforcement and the rise of ‘commitment decisions’ as the
pre-eminent means through which ‘law-intensive’ cases are closed. On the
other hand, institutional change has not affected the role of EU antitrust law
as a primary means to achieve the objectives of the internal market. If any-
thing, enforcement aimed at contributing to the integration of Member States’
economies has become more ambitious.
The analysis provided in this article is positive in nature. Its ambition and
expected contribution to the field was, first, to develop an operational frame-
work allowing for the systematic study of competition law enforcement – in the
EU and beyond – and, second, to map comprehensively the decision-making
activity of the Commission. The article did not aim at establishing causal re-
lationships and its expected contribution was not contingent on doing so. At
most, it was possible to claim that some trends in the Commission’s enforce-
ment priorities were consistent with other developments – and in particular
with the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 and the shift to a ‘more economics-
based approach’. Efforts at establishing the causes behind the said trends will
have to wait for future research.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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